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LIBEL AND SLANDER IN VIRGINIA
Thomas E. Spahn*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of libel and slander in Virginia is unsettled. Even defin-
ing the terms is difficult. While many states classify libel and slan-
der as separate torts, in Virginia defamation encompasses them
both.' Moreover, there are two separate definitions of "defamation
per se" in Virginia.2 There are also two types of "malice" which are
applicable in defamation actions;' and to make matters worse, one
type of "malice" which actually is not malice at all is called "actual
malice."4
Other aspects of the law of defamation are as confusing as the
definition of its terms. Astonishingly, no one can say with certainty
what statute of limitations governs Virginia defamation actions.5
Furthermore, the standard of liability which will apply to many
defendants' actions has not even been determined.' The Virginia
Model Jury Instructions simply leave a blank, which invites attor-
neys to construct an appropriate standard.7
Much of the blame for the bewildering state of the law lies with
the United States Supreme Court. Beginning in 1964, federal con-
stitutional requirements arising from the first amendment8 and ap-
* B.A., magna cum laude, Yale University, 1974; J.D., Yale University, 1977. Mr. Spahn
is an associate in the firm of McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Virginia.
1. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
Virginia defamation law seems to have a language all its own. For instance, "[i]f the accu-
sation is not made by the words spoken, taken in connection with the colloquium and aver-
ment, it cannot be supplied by the innuendo." 12A ?McHm's JUR. Libel and Slander § 40
(1978).
2. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 86.
4. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. The term "actual malice" was formu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). Virginia has compounded the problem by referring to both forms of malice as "ac-
tual malice." See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
7. 2 VIRGIMA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONs-CiVL No. 37.080 (Michie 1981).
8. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
... ." U.S. CONST. amend. L
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plied to the states through the fourteenth amendment' were in-
jected into state defamation law.'0 Unlike the situation in other
areas of the law where constitutional principles simply serve as an
overarching guardian of individual rights, the first amendment has
- seeped into almost every aspect of the law of libel and slander.11
This infusion of constitutional doctrine has brought neither clarity
nor uniformity. In an era when the law is thought to apply equally
to all, the Supreme Court's interpretation of these constitutional
principles mandates a threshold question in every defamation ac-
tion as to the status of the plaintiff and the defendant because dif-
ferent rules apply to each category of plaintiffs and defendants. 2
Perhaps it would have been better if the constitutional inroads had
been even more intrusive. In those areas of the law of defamation
left to the discretion of the states, 3 courts have often either con-
tradicted constitutional principles or declined to set any legal stan-
dard at all.'4
The law of libel and slander in Virginia is a perplexing mix of
nineteenth century law, unique language, and first amendment
principles dictated by the United States Supreme Court. This dis-
order might be excusable if libel and slander were a backwater of
the law. However, it is difficult to find another tort deservedly re-
ceiving as much attention. Recent "megaverdicts"' 5 have high-
lighted the significance of libel and slander to defendants and at-
tracted the attention of plaintiffs everywhere. Given the relative
ease of preparing a defamation action, when compared to other
lawsuits, as well as the public antipathy toward media defen-
dants," defamation actions may become one of the fastest growing
branches of tort law.
9. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (first amendment applies to the states through fourteenth
amendment).
10. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 81-90.
12. Plaintiffs are categorized as public or private and defendants are categorized as media
or individual.
13. See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1448-51 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Eaton, The American Law of Defamation].
14. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
15. See Goodale, Is the Public "Getting Even" With Press in Libel Cases?, 188 N.Y.L.J.,
29 (1982) (twenty-six million dollar verdict against Penthouse magazine; nine million, two
hundred thousand dollar verdict against the Alton (Ill.) Telegraph).
16. Id.
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Unfortunately, the law is not ready for this development. If the
Supreme Court's intervention into state law of libel and slander
was designed to guide courts to correct results, it has been an utter
failure. One recent study has estimated that while plaintiffs win
approximately eighty percent of the libel and slander jury trials in
actions against media defendants, defendants are successful in ap-
proximately sixty percent of their appeals from these verdicts.17
The combination of an increased number of cases and the confused
state of the law will undoubtedly heighten the danger of unjust
results.
While it is impossible to explore all of the intricacies of Vir-
ginia's law of libel and slander in a brief article, it is appropriate to
address many of the rudimentary concepts. These issues will be
raised in the context of answers to eight questions that both par-
ties should ask themselves when a defamation action is considered
or initiated.
II. NECESSARY INQUIRIES BEFORE INSTITUTING OR DEFENDING A
DEFAMATION ACTION
A. What was the Communication?
Since plaintiffs must plead the allegedly defamatory statement
with particularity,18 it is necessary to know the exact words com-
municated. However, in Virginia it makes no difference whether
the words were written or spoken. Unlike most states, Virginia rec-
ognizes no distinction between actions for libel and slander. 9
The communication must be made to a third person - a process
called "publication." 20 Although the issue of publication might
17. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 797, 829.
18. Federal Land Bank v. Birchfield, 173 Va. 200, 215, 3 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1939).
19. Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 889, 275 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1981); Shupe v. Rose's
Stores, 213 Va. 374, 375-76, 192 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1972).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568 sets forth the following distinctions:
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed
words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication
that has the potentially harmful qualitites characteristic of written or printed words.
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transi-
tory gestures or by any form of communication other than those stated in subsection
(1) [above].
20. Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 866, 159 S.E. 87, 90 (1931). But see, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-45 (Repl. Vol. 1977) ("insulting words" exception) (citing Hines v. Gravines, 136
Va. 313, 112 S.E. 869 (1923); Davis v. Heflin, 130 Va. 169, 107 S.E. 673 (1921); Rolland v.
1983]
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seem to be a simple matter, the question often arises as to whether
the publication requirement is satisfied by communications be-
tween principals and agents, businessmen and their secretaries,
etc. In this area, the law of defamation does not always follow that
of conspiracy21 or agency. 22 Communication between different
agents of the same principal, such as employees of a corporation,
can satisfy the publication requirement.2"
The communication must be false24 - this is one of the few
common law principles receiving the United States Supreme
Court's imprimatur.25 Unlike some states, Virginia has not taken
the bold step of placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove the fal-
sity of the allegedly defamatory communication, 2  but Virginia
continues to permit defendants to plead truth as an affirmative de-
fense.27 Most defendants use the opportunity, since failure to es-
tablish truth after pleading it will not prejudice defendant unless
he had no basis for his pleading.2 Defendant need not establish
the "literal truth" of the communication. If the statement is "sub-
stantially true," plaintiff loses.2 9 The sanctity of truth as a defense
could apparently lead to the odd result that a defendant might be
absolved after maliciously spreading a rumor he thinks is false, but
which is later found to be true. Since there is no common law inva-
sion of privacy in Virginia,30 and the torts of intentionals' or negli-
Batchelder, 84 Va. 664, 5 S.E. 695 (1888)).
21. 4A MicHIE'S JUR. Conspiracy § 4 (1978) ("Acts and declarations of one of several
persons who have conspired to commit a crime, are, in contemplation of the law, the acts
and declarations of all.").
22. 1A MIcHIE's JUR. Agency § 84 (1978) ("All the acts of an agent in the discharge of his
duties and within the scope of his authority... are obligatory upon the principal."); see
also United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 954 (1963).
23. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nance, 165 Va. 363, 379, 182 S.E. 264, 270
(1935).
24. See Falwell v. Penthouse, Int'l, 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (W.D. Va. 1981).
25. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
26. See, e.g., Manale v. City of New Orleans, 673 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir. 1982); McIntire
v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 479 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D. Mass. 1979); Michaud v. In-
habitants of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me. 1978); Dunlap v. Philadelphia News-
papers, 301 Pa. Super. 475, -, 448 A.2d 6, 11-14 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, 172, 73 S.E. 472, 476 (1912).
28. Snyder v. Fatherly, 153 Va. 762, 765-66, 151 S.E. 149, 150-51 (1930).
29. Saleeby v. Free Press, 197 Va. 761, 763, 91 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1956) ("Slight inaccura-
cies of expression are immaterial provided the defamatory charge is true in substance, and it
is sufficient to show that the imputation is 'substantially' true.").
30. Falwell v. Penthouse, Int'l, 521 F. Supp. at 1206; Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209,
1213 (W.D. Va. 1977). But cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (an individual
whose likeness is appropriated for trade or advertising purposes may file an action).
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gent3 2 infliction of emotional distress have not evolved very far,
there is little a plaintiff can do about the spreading of a true
statement.3
Since only false statements are actionable, the communication
must be capable of such proof. Thus, opinion cannot be the basis
of a defamation action because it cannot be proven false. 4 Unfor-
tunately, it is often difficult to determine if a statement is one of
opinion or fact.3  Fact does not become opinion if prefaced by a
statement such as "I believe" or "I think." 6 On the other hand,
many statements that appear to be factual, such as "he has the
morals of a snake," cannot be proven true or false, and are there-
fore nonactionable opinion. Cases involving some fairly harsh opin-
ions have been dismissed for this reason. 7
31. See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974) (only "outra-
geous and intolerable" conduct that causes "severe" emotional distress is actionable); see
also Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., 208 Va. 438, 441-42, 158 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (1967).
32. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 31, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973) (in negligence actions,
plaintiff must suffer physical injury that can be proven by "clear and convincing" evidence
to have arisen from the emotional disturbance).
33. See Falwell v. Penthouse, Int'l, 521 F. Supp. at 1204 (no recovery for admittedly accu-
rate interview).
Theoretically, truth should not be a defense to Virginia's statutory cause of action for
defamation. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-45 (Repl. Vol. 1977) renders actionable communications
which "tend to violence and breach of the peace." Although truthful statements can have
this effect as readily as false statements, this statutory "insulting words" cause of action has
now been completely assimilated into the law of defamation (except that it is not necessary
that a third person hear the communication). Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196
Va. 1, 6-7, 82 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1954). Thus, the requirement of falsity has been read into the
statute. See Guide Publishing Co. v. Futrell, 175 Va. 77, 87, 7 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1940).
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); see also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) (Opinion "is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undis-
closed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.").
Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to apply this principle,
at least one federal court applying Virginia law has adopted it. Evans v. Lawson, 351 F.
Supp. 279, 287 (W.D. Va. 1972).
35. This determination is made by the court as a matter of law. A three-pronged analysis
of the statement is used, whereby the court examines: 1) the context in which the statement
was uttered or published; 2) any cautionary words used by the person publishing the state-
ment; and 3) the circumstances surrounding the statement, such as medium of publication
and its anticipated audience. See Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer
Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980); Stuart v. Gambling Times, 534 F. Supp. 170, 172
(D.N.J. 1982).
36. Cianci v. New Times, 639 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1980), modified on other grounds, 6
Med. L. Rptr. 2145 (2d Cir. 1980).
37. See, e.g., Rand v. New York Times Co., 75 A.D.2d 417, 430 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1980) (alle-
gation that a manager had "screwed" and "f... .d over" a singer was found incapable of
supporting a defamation action).
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The communication must not only be false, it must be defama-
tory. This requirement has two components. First, the communica-
tion must be derogatory 8 and "diminish the esteem, respect, good-
will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or . . . excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
him."39 Thus, a newspaper would not be liable if it listed an incor-
rect address for the subject of a news story, although it might be
liable if the address given were that of a notorious whorehouse. 0 If
the defamatory nature of the communication appears on its face, it
is called defamation per se.41 If it is necessary to look beyond the
statement, the action is one for defamation per quod.42 Analyzing
defamation per quod involves a series of mysterious sounding pro-
cedures that make little sense. Plaintiffs must supply the extrinsic
facts that render the communication defamatory, labeled the "in-
ducement," and then combine the communication and the extrin-
sic facts, a process called "innuendo. ' '43 Second, it must be likely
that those receiving the communication will believe it to be true.
Obvious humor or hyperbole will not form the basis of a libel or
slander action. 44 Although Virginia courts have not explicitly rec-
ognized this rule, it follows naturally from the law as it now exists
in the state.45
B. When was the Communication Made?
One of the most remarkable aspects of defamation law in Vir-
ginia is the uncertainty concerning the applicable statute of limita-
tions; it is not explicitly outlined in the Code of Virginia. Defama-
tion often harms the plaintiff personally, which would subject it to
the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. 46 But defa-
mation may instead injure plaintiff's business or other property,
38. Falwell v. Penthouse, Int'l, 521 F. Supp. at 1204.
39. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971); see also Fuller v.
Edwards, 180 Va. 191, 22 S.E.2d 26 (1942).
40. See O'Neill v. Edmonds, 157 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Va. 1958).
41. See Shupe v. Rose's Stores, 213 Va. 374, 192 S.E.2d 766 (1972); see also infra text
accompanying note 108.
42. See Wilder v. Johnson Publishing Co., 551 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1982). In Wilder,
the defamatory meaning of the magazine article arose "by innuendo from the published
words in combination with known extrinsic facts, the 'inducement.'" Id. at 623.
43. Id. at 623-25; see also Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588
(1954).
44. See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971).
45. See, e.g., Corr v. Lewis, 94 Va. 24, 26 S.E. 385 (1896).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1977) (two-year statute of limitations).
774 [Vol. 17:769
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which would be governed by a five-year statute of limitations.4" On
the other hand, the fact that defamation might have both effects
renders it likely that the defamation action is governed by the one-
year "catch-all" provision of the Virginia Code.48 The Revisers of
the Code apparently did not see the logic of this analysis, since
only malicious prosecution and abuse of process are mentioned in
the Revisers' Note.
There are two interesting aspects of the limitations defense: one
helps defendant, one hurts. Plaintiff need not even hear or read
the communication for the limitations period to begin.49 Thus, a
plaintiff could be barred from filing an action even before he be-
comes aware of the defamation. On the other hand, defendant
might be liable for someone else's repetition of the communication
long after the statute has run on the original defamatory state-
ments. Defendant is liable for any "re-publication" of defamatory
statements that he authorizes or that are the "natural and proba-
ble consequences" of his original defamation.50
C. Who Was the Communication About?
The communication need not refer to the plaintiff by name. If
the plaintiff can be identified as the subject of the communication,
there may be grounds for a defamation action. 1 For instance, if an
allegation were made about the best center to play basketball for
the University of Virginia during the last decade, Ralph Sampson
might have a cause of action even if his name is not explicitly
mentioned.
If more than one person is the subject of the communication,
other considerations apply. Although the Virginia law of "group li-
bel" is largely undeveloped, it is generally acknowledged that
members of a defamed group will be allowed to pursue a defama-
tion action only if the group is small enough that the defamation
47. Id. § 8.01-243(B) (five-year statute of limitations).
48. Id. § 8.01-248 (one-year statute of limitations).
49. Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (4th Cir. 1983).
50. Compare Weaver v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 199 Va. 196, 200, 98 S.E.2d 687, 691 (1957)
(republication gives rise to new cause of action against original author) with Watt v. McKel-
vie, 219 Va. 645, 649, 248 S.E.2d 826, 829 (1978) (original publisher not liable for republica-
tion made by third party during privileged deposition hearing).
51. Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985, 997-98, 144 S.E. 624, 627-28 (1928) (advertisement re-
ferring to a door-to-door jewelry salesman in Franklin, Va., found to identify plaintiff).
1983]
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casts aspersions on all members of the group.5 2 For instance, a
statement that all lawyers are thieves will not create a cause of
action for any one lawyer. On the other hand, a comment that all
members of a five-man law firm are dishonest will probably be
actionable.
Group libel is one of the more interesting aspects of libel law.
Under current principles, a statement that one lawyer in the hy-
pothetical five-man firm is dishonest will create causes of action on
behalf of all five.53 Thus, the defendant who attempts to avoid lia-
bility by not explicitly naming the lawyer he believes to be dishon-
est may actually magnify his liability fivefold.
Once the subject of the communication is identified, it is critical
to determine if that subject is a public or a private person. This
distinction often determines the applicability of constitutional
rather than common law rules. Different standards of proof apply
to public and private plaintiffs in defamation actions. Generally, a
public plaintiff has a higher burden of proof than a private plain-
tiff.5 4 The Supreme Court has justified the higher standard for
public plaintiffs by noting that they have voluntarily undertaken
the risks of notoriety and they have greater access to opportunities
of rebutting libelous statements.5
Unfortunately, the tests used to make this important decision
are less than clear. The court 6 must determine whether the plain-
tiff has become a "public" person either by reason of an office he
holds57 or by voluntarily entering the public "limelight."58 Further-
more, a plaintiff may be considered "public" for all purposes or for
only a limited range of issues.59
Recent United States Supreme Court cases have narrowed the
52. See Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 409-10, 121 S.E. 912, 914 (1924) ("unscrupulous
rich men" and "whiskey smugglers" did not adequately identify House of Delegates mem-
bers who supported certain legislation).
53. Id. at 411, 121 S.E. at 914.
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
55. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
56. See Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981).
57. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (" '[P]ublic official' designation applies...
to ... government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs."). See generally 19 A.L.R. 3d
1361 (1968) (discussing the definition of "public official").
58. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. at 345.
59. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (when considered public for a
limited range of issues, the plaintiff is classified as a "vortex" plaintiff).
776 [Vol. 17:769
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definition of public persons.60 The Court now appears to be em-
phasizing the voluntary nature of plaintiff's fame. This approach
precludes clever media defendants from providing wide coverage to
a potential or actual plaintiff in order to increase the plaintiff's
burden of proof. Regardless of the rules used, determining whether
a plaintiff is a "public" person or a "private" individual is often
outcome determinative, on appeal if not at trial, and thus is a criti-
cal threshold determination."1
D. Was the Defendant Privileged to Communicate?
Even if a communication is false and defamatory, the defendant
might be immunized by a privilege. The privilege can arise either
as a result of the substance of the communication or because of the
recipient himself. Virginia recognizes absolute and qualified privi-
leges, which are derived from two sources - the common law and
legislative enactment.
60. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). See Note, Public Figures and Malice: Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Restricting the Constitutional Privilege, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 737 (1980).
The extent of constitutional protection has fluctuated. For instance, in Rosenbloom v.
Metro Media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), the United States Supreme Court extended the pub-
lic figure doctrine to any communications about matters of public concern. The Virginia
Supreme Court adopted this rule in Virginia one year later. Sanders v. Harris, 213 Va. 369,
192 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1972). Unfortunately for Virginia, the Supreme Court repudiated Ro-
senbloom in 1974. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Since the United States
Supreme Court feels less compunction about overruling its earlier decisions than does Vir-
ginia's highest court, the Virginia court might justifiably feel "sandbagged" by the shifting
rules. Sanders stands as a monument to the fallacy that constitutional doctrines are
changeless.
61. This determination is even more difficult in actions brought by corporations. Having
created the legal fiction that a corporation is treated the same as an individual, the law has
had to live with this fiction even in areas such as defamation. That corporations can file
actions for defamation might seem ridiculous, but it is true. See General Prods. Co., v. Mer-
edith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Va. 1981) (corporation alleged that magazine article
defamed corporation's name and disparaged its products). The strain on logic and common
sense caused by this rule is particularly evident when the court must determine if the plain-
tiff is a "public" or "private" person. Courts are called upon to dutifully determine if a
corporation is a "public" corporation or a "private" corporation (whatever that means). At
least one Virginia commentator has criticized the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for not
creating an entirely separate test for determining if a corporation is a "public" or "private"
entity. Fourth Circuit Review, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 413, 716 (1981) (discussing Arctic
Co. v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102
(1981)).
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1. Absolute Privilege
As might be expected, absolute privileges are narrowly con-
strued.2 Common law absolute privileges include communications
made in the course of legislative,6 3 judicial,64 and quasi-judicial set-
tings such as certain administrative proceedings. 5 The statutory
absolute privileges include communications concerning an em-
ployee provided to the Virginia Employment Commission 66 and re-
ports by school personnel of student alcohol or drug abuse.67
2. Qualified Privilege
Qualified privileges are more subtle and more complex. The
most widespread common law qualified privilege results when the
defendant communicates in "discharge of a public or private duty,
legal or moral, or in the prosecution of his own rights or interests"
to someone else with a reciprocal interest in the subject matter of
the communication.6 8 A typical statement subject to qualified priv-
ilege is that of an employer responding to a reference check about
one of his former employees.6 One of the more intriguing qualified
privileges recognized in Virginia is that of the media or a citizen
discussing "matters of public concern."70 This privilege has been
62. On at least one occasion, the Virginia Supreme Court has given an incorrect definition
of "absolute privilege." In Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 198 Va. 154, 159, 93 S.E.2d
274, 279 (1956), the court found that "an absolutely privileged communication is one for
which an action will not lie, unless there has been an abuse of the privilege." This is a
definition of a qualified privilege. See infra text accompanying notes 72-75.
63. Story v. Norfolk-Portsmouth Newspapers, Inc., 202 Va. 588, 590, 118 S.E.2d 668, 669
(1961). The court in Story mentions another intriguing absolute privilege - one protecting
the communication of "military and naval officers." Id. Unfortunately, the exact contours of
this variety of absolute privilege have not been delineated.
64. Pennick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 627, 140 S.E. 664, 670 (1927); see also Massey v.
Jones, 182 Va. 200, 204, 28 S.E.2d 623, 626 (1944). There is some disturbing language in
Massey indicating that the privilege may be lost if the communication is irrelevant to the
subject matter of the proceeding. See supra note 62.
65. Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
67. Id. § 8.01-47 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
68. Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, 161, 73 S.E. 472, 476 (1912). See also
M. Rosenburg & Sons v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 519, 29 S.E.2d 375, 380 (1944).
69. See Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564, 172 S.E.2d 720 (1970). Other examples include
a statement made about a business competitor, Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985, 144 S.E. 624
(1928), a communication between an insurance adjustor and an insured, Crawford & Co. v.
Graves, 199 Va. 495, 100 S.E.2d 714 (1957), and media reports based on public records,
Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 198 Va. 154, 93 S.E.2d 274 (1956).
70. James v. Haymes, 163 Va. 873, 878, 178 S.E. 18, 20 (1935) (privilege exists only if the
"comment or stricture is based upon established facts").
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applied to immunize a newspaper editorial.71
The privilege is "qualified" because it can be lost if "abused. '72
The court normally determines if the privilege exists, while the
jury decides if it has been abused.73 Abuses include common law
malice,74 exaggeration, and publication of the statement more
widely than necessary.7 5 Thus, the abuse can encompass either the
substance of the communication or the way in which the communi-
cation wds made.
The statutory qualified privileges include: 1) information sup-
plied to the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission;7 6 2) repeti-
tion by a radio or television station of a third party's statements;77
3) disclosure of information to an insurance institution;78 and 4)
statements made in disciplinary investigations of lawyers by the
State Bar."
E. Was the Communication Made with the Requisite Degree of
Fault?
As explained above in connection with the public-private person
dichotomy, there are different standards of care applicable to dif-
ferent communications at different times.8 0 This is one of the most
confusing areas of libel and slander law in Virginia.
71. Id. At some point, however, a commentary on public affairs would become an "opin-
ion" - which is not capable of supporting an action for defamation. This, of course, is a
much safer means of characterizing an editorial, since protecting it with a qualified privilege
provides only a limited immunity.
72. Guide Publishing Co. v. Futrell, 175 Va. 77, 87, 7 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1940).
73. Story v. Norfolk-Portsmouth Newspapers, Inc., 202 Va. 588, 591, 118 S.E.2d 668, 670
(1961); Bragg v. Elmore, 152 Va. 312, 315, 147 S.E. 275, 279 (1928).
74. See infra note 86.
75. See, e.g., Preston v. Land, 220 Va. 118, 122, 255 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1979).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.14 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (privilege lost if informant motivated by
"actual malice"). See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussion of "actual
malice").
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-49 (privilege lost if due care not taken).
78. Id. § 38.1-57.25 (Repl. Vol. 1981) (privilege lost if information is false and given with
"malice").
79. Id. § 54-47 (Repl. Vol. 1982) (privilege lost if communicated with "actual malice" and
without probable cause).
80. Defamatory communications can also lead to criminal misdemeanor prosecutions. See,
e.g., id. § 18.2-416 (use of abusive language calculateA to provoke a breach of the peace); id.
§ 18.2-417 (words imputing unchaste acts to chaste women, unless provoked); id. § 18.2-209
(knowingly making false statements to newspapers, television stations or other media); id. §
6.1-119 (defamatory statements about the financial conditions of banks).
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1. Public Plaintiffs
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"' the Supreme Court ruled
that a media defendant cannot be found liable for a communica-
tion regarding a public person unless the plaintiff establishes with
"convincing clarity" 82 that the defendant communicated with
"knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not."83 This standard may not be a
paradigm of clarity, but it makes sense. However, the Supreme
Court forfeited its chance to bring lucidity to the law of defama-
tion by defining this standard as "actual malice."8s The use of the
term "actual malice" has only served to generate confusion among
lower courts that have attempted to apply this standard to a vari-
ety of situations.8 "
This article will use the term "constitutional malice" in discuss-
ing the Supreme Court's standard in Sullivan. "Constitutional
malice" is very different from the common law "malice" with
which most lawyers are familiar."6 Constitutional malice focuses
only on the communicator's belief concerning the truth of what he
says.87 The communicator's motives are entirely irrelevant. In pub-
81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Virginia Supreme Court first applied Sullivan in Sanders v.
Harris, 213 Va. 369, 372, 192 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1972).
82. As with other important aspects of its new doctrine, the United States Supreme Court
selected a confusing phrase. It is not clear what "convincing clarity" means. Virginia has
utilized the "clear and convincing evidence" standard to award punitive damages without
actual or compensatory damages in a defamation per se action. Newspaper Publishing Corp.
v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 805, 224 S.E.2d 132, 136 (1976). "Convincing clarity" is considered by
some state courts to be the burden of proof between "preponderance of the evidence" and
"beyond a reasonable doubt." See, e.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, 367 Mass. 849,
', 330 N.E.2d 161, 175 (1975).
83. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
84. Id. ,
85. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation, supra note 13, at 1371.
86. See Williams v. Trust Co. of Ga., 140 Ga. App. 49, _ 230 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1976)
(distinguishing common law malice, defined as "ill will, hatred, or 'charges calculated to
injure,"' from "actual malice" as defined by the Supreme Court).
87. It is difficult to determine what constitutes "constitutional malice." The Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia has cited Supreme Court decisions in finding that "[t]his standard is met if
the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.., or if the
publication was made with a 'subjective awareness of probable falsity.'" General Prods. Co.
v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546, 552 (E.D. Va. 1981) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
419 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974)).
As with many legal doctrines, it is easier to define what is not constitutional malice. It
may not be inferred from the publication alone, regardless of the seriousness of the allegedly
defamatory charge. Likewise, it may not be proven by failure to investigate alone. See Na-
der v. DeToledano, 408 A.2d 31, 41 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). The
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lic person defamation, constitutional malice is often the only mal-
ice that must be considered by the court or jury.
The confusion caused by the Supreme Court's terminology runs
deeper than might first be suspected. Having selected a totally in-
appropriate term to define its concept,8 the Supreme Court pro-
ceeded to provide a misleading definition. It is now apparent that
the word "reckless" as used in the Supreme Court's definition of
constitutional malice does not follow the traditional definition of
"reckless" from tort law. The court for the Southern District of
New York has explained that in the context of a defamation action
"reckless does not mean grossly negligent, its common use, but
rather intentional disregard." 9 The "reckless" component of con-
stitutional malice is naturally the more difficult to understand. It is
no wonder that at least one Virginia scholar has cited the jury's
confusion in concluding that "the much-vaunted distinction be-
tween negligence and recklessness, and thus the importance of
characterizing the plaintiff as a public or private figure, appears
evanescent." 90
As might be expected, the existence of two kinds of "malice"
complicates defamation law. Consider a qualifiedly privileged com-
munication - for it is with qualifiedly privileged communications
that the confusion between constitutional malice and common law
malice becomes clearest. If a public person is the subject of a com-
munication which the court finds to be qualifiedly privileged, he
can recover only if he establishes both (1) that the qualified privi-
lege was abused by, inter alia, common law malice, and (2) that the
defendant was guilty of constitutional malice.
Virginia courts have not attempted to cure the confusion. Before
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Virginia used the term "actual
latter fact is the more interesting, because it might reward a media defendant for failing to
check his sources. Courts have generally found that failure to investigate is not evidence of
constitutional malice unless the source of information is known to be unreliable. See, e.g.,
Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, _, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 36, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
984 (1979); Savannah News-Press v. Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233, -, 254 S.E.2d 151, 153
(1979).
88. At least one Supreme Court Justice has confessed his regret at having selected the
term "malice" to define a standard that has nothing to do with hostility or ill will. See
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J. dissenting). The Court as a whole
seems unrepentent. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251 (1974)
(characterizing the term "actual malice" as a "convenient shorthand expression").
89. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
90. LaRue, Living with Gertz: A Practical Look at Constitutional Libel Standards, 67
VA. L. REv. 287, 294 (1981).
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malice" to describe common law malice.9 1 Amazingly, the Virginia
Supreme Court continued to use "actual malice" to mean common
law malice even after Sullivan.92 In at least one case, the court
used the term "actual malice" twice on the same page - once to
mean common law malice, once to mean constitutional malice."
After Sullivan, use of the term "actual malice" to mean anything
but constitutional malice is inexplicable. 4
2. Private Plaintiffs
The standard of liability is even more confusing in actions
brought by private persons. The standard for damages in private
plaintiff actions depends on the defendant. The Supreme Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc."5 allowed the states to select any stan-
dard of care applicable to media defendants as long as strict liabil-
ity was not imposed. The Virginia Supreme Court has refused the
invitation." The federal courts have not been so timid, but they
cannot agree. One court believes that Virginia would apply the
constitutional malice standard, 97 while two courts believe a negli-
gence standard would apply.98 It is probably safe to assume that
media defendants will be held liable to a private plaintiff if merely
negligent.
No Virginia court has stepped forward to fill the final void in the
Gertz analysis - private plaintiff vs. private defendant. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has shown a remarkable degree of self-re-
straint in refusing to provide even a hint of what standard might
apply.9" A recent article by two William and Mary professors con-
91. People's Life Ins. Co. v. Talley, 166 Va. 464, 469, 186 S.E. 42, 44 (1936).
92. It would be interesting to observe the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretion of the
term "actual malice" as used in the statutes discussed supra at notes 76-79.
93. Sanders v. Harris, 213 Va. 369, 373, 192 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1972). But see Mills v. King-
sport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1979) (suggesting the confusion in
Sanders was due to the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S.
29 (1971), which was overruled in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
94. In Preston v. Land, 220 Va. 118, 119, 255 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1979), the Virginia Su-
preme Court revived yet another term to describe common law malice - "malice in fact."
95. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
96. See Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 804, 224 S.E.2d 132, 136
(1976).
97. Ryder v. Time, 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1170 (D.D.C. 1977).
98. General Prods. Co. v Meredith, 526 F. Supp. 546, 552 (E.D. Va. 1981); Mills v. King-
sport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005, 1010-11 (W.D. Va. 1979).
99. See Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 893, 275 S.E.2d 632, 638 (1981).
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cludes that a strict liability standard would govern. 00 This would
be a remarkable development. Given the first amendment consid-
erations present in defamation actions, the high standard of proof
applicable to punitive damages in any situation,' and the stan-
dard of proof applicable in an action brought by a public person, it
would be shocking to have a private individual held liable for any
defamatory communication concerning another private individual,
even if innocently made with the best of motives. One can hope
that the Virginia Supreme Court will apply a more logical and pro-
tective approach in cases involving a private plaintiff and a private
defendant.
To summarize, as the law now exists in Virginia, the following
standards apply: In a lawsuit involving a public plaintiff and a me-
dia defendant, the standard of proof is constitutional malice. Like-
wise, when a public plaintiff files suit against a private defendant,
the standard is also constitutional malice. When the plaintiff is a
private person, however, a media defendant will probably be held
liable for mere negligence. Finally, when both the plaintiff and the
defendant are private persons, the Virginia courts have not deter-
mined the applicable standard of proof.
F. Is Anyone Other than the Communicator Liable?
Imputed liability is one of the few areas of defamation law that
is familiar to the general practitioner. Employers are liable for de-
famatory communications made by employees acting within the
scope of their employment, but will generally be found liable for
punitive damages only if they ratified or authorized the defama-
tory statement.10 2
G. What Damages Did the Communication Cause?
The confused state of defamation law in Virginia is not limited
to liability issues. If anything, the law of compensatory damages is
even more perplexing, although the law of punitive damages is
100. Pagan and Walck, Private Rights and Public Forums: Classifying Plaintiffs in Vir-
ginia Defamation Suits, 7 VA. B.A. J. 8, 13 n.28 (Fall 1981).
101. See infra text accompanying note 103.
102. Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Mo~prs Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670, 675 (E.D.
Va. 1975); Slaughter v. Valleydale Packers, 198 Va. 339, 343-46, 94 S.E.2d 260, 263-65
(1956); W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 913, 141 S.E. 860, 862 (1928); Virginia Ry. &
Power Co. v. Deaton, 147 Va. 576, 582, 137 S.E. 500, 502 (1927).
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fairly simple. The United States Supreme Court has taken the law
of punitive damages in defamation cases out of the states' control.
They may be recovered by any plaintiff against any defendant if he
establishes "constitutional malice" by "clear and convincing evi-
dence."103 In defamation per se 10 4 cases, punitive damages may be
awarded even in the absence of a compensatory damage award.10 5
Compensatory damages are a different matter. As the law now
stands in Virginia, they are governed by a complex set of technical
distinctions that are largely meaningless.
One of the few areas of defamation law that survives in the
memory of a former law student is that of defamation per se. In
the common law, some statements were seen as so vile that dam-
ages would be presumed. These include:
(1) words imputing the commission of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude, (2) words imputing infection with a contagious or loathsome
disease,106 (3) words imputing an unfitness to perform the duties of
an office or employment of profit, or lack of integrity in the dis-
charge of such duties, (4) words prejudicing a person in his profes-
sion or trade.107
In all other cases, the plaintiff was not entitled to presumed dam-
ages and could not recover unless he proved that he had suffered
"special damages."
Unfortunately, the courts never bothered to define "special dam-
ages" with any precision. A fair reading of the Virginia cases before
1981108 would indicate that Virginia's definition of "special dam-
ages" would not vary from the generally accepted definition -
provable monetary loss. 0 9 In fact, the Virginia Supreme Court has
on at least one occasion used the term "pecuniary loss" in place of
"special damage" in the standard formulation of damage in a defa-
103. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
104. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
105. Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 805, 224 S.E.2d 132, 136 (1976).
106. Fortunately for'the real scholar, new diseases such as herpes and acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) have arisen to take the place of those vanquished by the ad-
vance of science.
107. Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 889, 275 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1981); see also Shuppe v.
Rose's Stores, Inc., 213 Va. 374, 376, 192 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1972).
108. See, e.g., M. Rosenberg & Sons v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 521, 29 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1944);
Connelly v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Va. 51, 53-54, 40 S.E. 618, 619 (1902).
109. See, e.g., Smith v. Phoenix Furniture Co., 339 F. Supp. 969, 971 (D.S.C. 1972).
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mation case. 110
In Fleming v. Moore,111 however, the Supreme Court of Virginia
rendered the distinction between per se and non-per se defamation
cases irrelevant for most practical purposes. The court found "spe-
cial damages" to include "emotional upset and embarrassment."11 2
Since only an uninformed plaintiff would fail to allege embarrass-
ment and emotional harm, it would be a rare exception for a com-
plaint to be deficient as a matter of law even if the defamation was
not of the per se variety. Moreover, since proof of "special dam-
ages" would conceivably consist only of the plaintiff taking the
stand and testifying that he was "upset,"' 3 the distinction be-
tween per se and non-per se defamation has been effectively elimi-
nated by Fleming."4 Perhaps the supreme court did not mean
what it said in Fleming. If it did, however, the per se analysis has
become largely obsolete in Virginia.115
On a more practical level, establishing damages is one of the
more intriguing aspects of defamation law. Plaintiffs usually allege
three forms of damage - reputational, financial and personal. A
layman might expect plaintiff to bring to the stand people who had
a high regard for him before the defamation but now find him
loathsome and repugnant. In practical terms, however, such a wit-
ness is never found. Plaintiff usually produces witnesses who know
him. These people normally think highly of plaintiff before and
after the defamation.
Financial damage is also difficult to prove. In a business setting,
for instance, a plaintiff might try to show that a banker refused to
loan him money because of a defamatory statement. However,
since the banker would be chagrined to admit that he relied on
what is probably a false statement about plaintiff in denying the
loan, he would probably not admit to being affected by it. Proof of
110. Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, 171, 73 S.E. 472, 474 (1912).
111. 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981).
112. Id. at 894, 275 S.E.2d at 639.
113. Perhaps expert testimony will be required to establish the plaintiff's emotional harm
(as in medical malpractice cases). If the courts were to add this requirement, some of the
harm done in Fleming might be avoided.
114. The constitutional issues remain, however. Although few states have taken the hint,
the United States Supreme Court has stated in dicta that presumed damages should be
unavailable absent constitutional malice. Gertz v. Yobert Welch, Inc., 419 U.S. 323, 349
(1974).
115. There is only one remaining difference - in per se cases punitive damages may be
awarded in the absence of actual damages. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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financial damage often takes the form of "yardstick" proof, in
which plaintiff compares his income before and after the defama-
tion. Finally, any claimed personal damage contains all the same
vagaries as other forms of "pain and suffering." Most libel and
slander cases therefore go to the jury with no real proof of dam-
ages. Even if plaintiff were able to muster some proof, the jury is
normally given no guidance in setting the amount of damages.
What could compensate a plaintiff for a false newspaper article
that has been circulated to 25,000 people? There is simply no way
to quantify such harm.
These uncertainties also make defamation actions difficult to
settle. There are no multipliers that can be applied to "specials" as
in automobile cases, or damage figures capable of being
"massaged" by experts as in antitrust and securities cases. The
best way to determine a proper settlement figure is to catalogue
previous defamation awards given in the same area. Unfortunately,
it is often difficult to amass such data.
H. Should Plaintiff File a Defamation Action?
After weighing the considerations described above, a prospective
plaintiff must still decide if it is worthwhile to file a defamation
action. Some peculiar aspects of Virginia law favor plaintiffs. For
instance, summary judgment is a commonly used tool in federal
courts to dispose of defamation cases. Although the Supreme
Court seems to disagree,"" a number of courts have established a
separate, defendant-oriented standard of summary judgment ap-
plicable to libel and slander cases. 1117 These courts reason that the
enormous amount of time and expense needed to defend a libel
case, including the inevitable jury loss and the expense of an ap-
peal, would have a "chilling effect" on first amendment rights of
media defendants." 8 In Virginia, however, there is a law forbidding
depositions to be used in summary judgment proceedings." 9 This
law renders the defendant-oriented standard inapplicable in
116. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979).
117. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1976)
(applying South Carolina law) (Since plaintiff "failed to state unequivocally [in his deposi-
tion] that the allegedly libelous statements were false" and he failed "by affadavit or other-
wise [to] offer evidence establishing a conflict as to whether the statements were false in any
substantial degree," granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment was proper.).
118. Id.
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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Virginia.
On the other hand, a plaintiff who files a defamation action gen-
erally waives any right of privacy he might otherwise claim. Defen-
dants use two keys to open plaintiff's life story. First, defendants
have the right to establish the truth of the defamatory state-
ment.1 20 Second, defendants will often try to establish that plain-
tiff's reputation was so sullied before the alleged defamation that
defendant should not be found liable for worsening it. These two
approaches - especially the latter - often involve an investiga-
tion of the most personal aspects of the plaintiff's life. Whether
plaintiff wishes to pay this price, especially given such a poor track
record for plaintiffs on appeal, 2 " is a question that all prospective
plaintiffs must seriously consider.
III. CONCLUSION
This brief article has explored some of the perplexities of Vir-
ginia defamation law. Many of the problems could be alleviated if
proper terminology were developed and if the Virginia Supreme
Court would fill 'in the blanks left by first amendment principles.
Even then, however, the very nature of the tort will likely continue
to produce some degree of uncertainty.
120. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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